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CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM REVISITED: Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
Constitutional federalism is the basis on which the United States govern-
ment was created.' However, the concept of constitutional federalism has not
yet been clearly defined, and as a consequence, conflicting viewpoints on
federalism have arisen.' These conflicting viewpoints are best illustrated by the
law concerning the commerce clause.'
With the recent expansion of the commerce clause,' the United States
Supreme Court was faced with defining constitutional federalism, in order to
evaluate the legitimacy of commerce clause legislation.' The task of defining
constitutional federalism, however, only served to create a dispute over
federalism among the Supreme Court Justices." In 1985, the Supreme Court
renewed the continuing debate over the definition of constitutional federalism
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.7
THE CONCEPT OF FEDERALISM
Constitutional federalism has been defined as "a principle of government
which provides for the division of powers between a national government and
a collection of state governments operating over the same geographical area."'
This definition does not, however, provide a guide to the proper division of
power allocated to the national and state governments respectively. It is this
lack of clarity in definition that has created the conflict surrounding the con-
cept of federalism.
Essentially, two views of constitutional federalism exist." These views
'Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection
of the National Government 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Wechsler).
'See infra notes 6-22, and accompanying text.
'Fallon, The Commerce Clause: A Theoretical Commeni, 61 OR. L. REV. 395, 395 (1982) (hereinafter
cited as O'Fallon). U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 2 provides:
"The Congress shall have the Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes;" U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
'See infra notes 38-40, and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 40-46, and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 53-54, and 81, and accompanying text.
7Garcia, 105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
1H. CHASE & C. DUCAT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, CASEs-.ESSAYS-MATERIALS 371 (2d ed. 1979)
(hereinafter cited as CHASE).
'These views represent the dominant theories expressed concerning federalism. They are not, however, ex-
clusive. One theory is that the role of states should be used to protect its citizens' rights. Unlike dual and
cooperative federalism, this view finds a middle ground between: (1) reliance on the tenth amendment to
create state sovereignty; and (2) the dismissal of the tenth amendment as being meaningless. Beschle, Defin-
ing the Scope of State Sovereignty Under the Tenth Amendment: A Structural Approach 34 DE PAUL L.
REV. 163, 185 (1985) (hereinafter cited as Beschle).
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have been termed "dual federalism,""0 and "cooperative federalism."" "Dual
federalism" envisions the powers of the federal and state governments to be
"mutually exclusive," 2 with the federal government possessing very limited
powers. 3 The remaining powers are to be retained by the states." Dual
federalists cite the tenth amendment as evidence of the constitutional limits on
federal governmental powers.'
The second approach to federalism is "cooperative federalism," which is
appropriately described as "a concept of partnership between the national and
state governments which acknowledges the fact of national supremacy and the
reality that the terms of the partnership are almost entirely fixed by the
strength and power of the central government." 6 Advocates of cooperative
federalism believe that the states surrendered a large majority of their sover-
eignty when joining the Union. 7 Cooperative federalists regard the tenth
amendment as a "mere truism,"' 8 which is lacking in any grant of power to the
states. 9
At the inception of our nation, the constitutional framers sought a com-
promise between the conflicting principles of dual and cooperative
federalism.2" As a product of that search, the Constitution and the first ten
"0Corwin, Congress's Power To Prohibit Commerce, 18 CORN. L.Q. 477, 481 (1933) (coining the term "dual
federalism").
"CHASE, supra note 8, at 373-74. See also Matsumoto, National League of Cities - From Footnote to
Holding, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 38-39 (1977) (utilizing the same theories but using different terms; traditional
state function model and federal power model). These two views have also appeared in interpretations of the
enactment of the tenth amendment. Percy, National League of Cities v. Usery: The Tenth Amendment is
Alive and Doing Well, 51 TUL. L. REv. 95, 98-99 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Percy).
"CHASE. supra note 8, at 373.
"Wechsler, supra note 1, at 544.
"Id. See also Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: the New Federalism And Affirmative Rights to
Essential Government Service. 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1070 (1977) (hereinafter cited as Tribe). Dual
federalists feel that the national government was granted limited delegated powers. These limits were sup-
plemented by limits on the power of the national government implied from the necessity of the states' in-
dependent existence. Id. supra.
"CHASE, supra note 8, at 374. Another theory proposed in support of dual federalism is the contractual
origin of the Constitution itself. Under this theory, the states are seen as giving up portions of their power
while retaining the rest. Id. at 373.
Supporters of the dual federalist theory include James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, Robert Hayne
(Webster-Haynes debate), John Calhoun, Chief Justice Taney, Justice Van Devanter, Justice McReynolds,
Justice Sutherland, and Justice Butler. Id. at 374. See also, O'Fallon, supra note 3.
'6CHASE, supra note 8, at 374.
'Note, Constitutional Limitations of Congress' Commerce Clause Power 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 109, 119
(1982) (hereinafter cited as Constitutional Limitations).
"United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
1d. at 124. Other constitutional provisions cited in support of this theory are the enumerated powers in con-
junction with the necessary and proper clause, and the supremacy clause. See e.g., CHASE. supra note 8, at
374-76.
Supporters of the cooperative federalist theory have been Alexander Hamilton, Daniel Webster,
Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, and Chief Justice John Marshall. CHASE, supra
note 8, at 374-76.
Comment, National League of Cities and The Parker Doctrine, 8 FORDHAM L. REv. 301, 301 (1980).
[Vol. 19:1
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Summer, 19851
amendments were adopted. 1 Notwithstanding this attempt to resolve the con-
flict, the dispute between dual and cooperative federalism has not ended." The
latest controversy concerning these theories is illustrated in the Supreme Court
case of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.23
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In order to better understand the significance of the Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Garcia, it is necessary to review briefly the history of the commerce
clause as well as the tenth amendment.
In 1819, McCulloch v. Maryland ' set the stage for the expansion of
cooperative federalism." In this landmark decision, Chief Justice John Mar-
shall espoused a broad interpretation of all enumerated powers of the federal
government. 6 The basis of his expansive view was the necessary and proper
clause of article I §8.27 The decision's significance is that it prohibited the use of
the tenth amendment in challenging the exercise of federal implied powers.28
Several years later, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 2 9 the Supreme Court expanded
the views expressed in McCulloch into the commerce clause area. The Gib-
bons opinion authored by Justice Marshall, held that Congress' commerce
power was plenary and not to be restrained by tenth amendment state
sovereignty claims.? Although "commerce" was not to include intrastate com-
"The Bill of Rights were added because of the objections raised by dual federalists. Chief among these objec-
tions were the need to preserve individual liberties and state autonomy. While the first nine amendments can
be seen to establish such individual liberties as freedom of speech (first amendment), freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures (fourth amendment), and the right to jury trial (seventh amendment), the
tenth amendment is thought to establish undefined states' rights. Beschle, supra note 9, at 178.
nSee e.g., Percy, supra note 11 I(dual federalist notion that the tenth amendment acts as an obstacle to the ex-
ercise of delegated federal powers); Comment, When The Walls Come Tumbling Down: What Remains Of
National League Of Cities 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 625 (1984). (hereinafter cited as Tumbling Down) (the use of
the tenth amendment to block the exercise of the commerce clause will only cause the development of other
methods to control state activities).
z105 S.Ct. 1005 (1985).
2417 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
'Constitutional Limitations, supra note 16, at 117.
"McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406.
7The necessary and proper clause of U.S. CONsT. art. 1, §8 provides:
"The Congress shall have Power... to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying in-
to Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONsT. art. 1, §8.
"McCulloch. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406. But see BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING
282 (1975) (hereinafter cited as BREST). In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall observed...
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are ap-
propriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the let-
ter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional ... ." (emphasis added).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. By stating that constitutional exercises must be consistent with the
"spirit of the Constitution," the Chief Justice may have been suggesting that unwritten constitutional limita-
tions exist beyond the tenth amendment. BREST, supra at 282.
"22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
3Note, State Sovereignty and the Commerce Power, 9 CONN. L. REV. 691, 692 (1977).
RECENT CASES
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merce,1' it was to be broadly defined under the Marshall scheme.32
The Supreme Court's acceptance of cooperative federalism continued
without significant departure until the 1930's. It was during the 1930's that the
Supreme Court limited the reach of the commerce power through the concept
of dual federalism.33 The emergence of dual federalism and state rights,
however, did not develop. Changes in the Court's composition,"4 coupled with
the threat of President Roosevelt's "court packing plan" in 1937,11 brought
about the re-emergence of cooperative federalism.36 This re-emergence came
about in National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,37
where the Supreme Court held that the federal government could reach in-
trastate activities that had a practical effect on interstate commerce."
Jones & Laughlin Steel was the beginning of the trend which allowed the
federal commerce power to substitute its regulation for that of the states.39
That trend continued until it reached a zenith in Wickard v. Filburn, 0 where
the commerce clause was interpreted to its greatest extent." After Wickard,
dual federalists could no longer challenge the existence of commerce power
over state activities affecting interstate commerce." Rather, the arguments
began focusing on possible limits to the federal commerce power. One such
"Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-95.
"Id. at 189.
"Comment, The Commerce Power and State Sovereignty: Restriction Of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459, 460 (1984) (hereinafter cited as Restriction). See also Constitutional
Limitations, supra note 17, at 113. In a series of cases the Supreme Court struck down several attempts to in-
stitute New Deal legislation. See, e.g., Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). (The
Railroad Retirement Act was held to be invalid because it was not an appropriate exercise of power on an
otherwise federally regulated activity.); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
(Chicken Slaughterhouses engage in intrastate commerce alone, and therefore, can not be reached by the
National Industrial Recovery Act.); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). (The mining of coal
precedes all aspects of interstate commerce so that it does not have a direct effect on interstate commerce.
Therefore, the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act is not a valid exercise of federal commerce power.).
'Justice Willis Van Devanter retired in June of 1937. He was replaced by Justice Hugo Black who remained
on the bench from 1937 until 1971. BLANFORD & EVANS, 2 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
1789-1980, 1128-31 (1983) (hereinafter cited as BLANFORD).
'5S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) (Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary). This Act would
have allowed the President the power to appoint additional Justices to the Supreme Court when a sitting
Justice reached seventy years of age. The only limitation on the President's power was that there be a total
of fifteen Justices on the Court. The purpose of the Act was to force any Justice over seventy years of age in-
to an early retirement so that President Roosevelt could add pro-New Deal Justices to the Court. This Act
would have given the President additional control over the Supreme Court.
'Restriction, supra note 33, at 461.
31301 U.S. 1 (1937).
mld. at 41-42.
"Restriction, supra note 33, at 467; See also Constitutional Limitations, supra note 17, at 114.
-371 U.S. 111 (1942); See Restriction, supra note 33, at 467.
"Restriction, supra note 33, at 461. Any intrastate activity which has an effect on interstate commerce,
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argument was predicated on the tenth amendment.'3
In Maryland v. Wirtz, the Supreme Court overruled the tenth amend-
ment arguments and upheld the regulation of state operated schools and
hospitals through the Fair Labor Standards Act.'5 The Court reasoned that
when the federal government used its delegated powers, the federal govern-
ment could override state interests regardless of their nature. 6 That expansive
view of the commerce power continued until 1976," when the Supreme Court
again restricted the federal government powers by invoking the doctrine of
dual federalism in National League of Cities v. Usery. "
National League has been called "one of the most controversial, most
written about and least followed Supreme Court rulings, of the past decade."' 9
The controversy surrounding National League originated because, for the first
time since the 1930's, the Supreme Court used the concept of state sovereignty
as a limit to the commerce clause."°
In National League, the Court again faced the validity of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. In 1974, Congress amended the Act to extend its minimum
wage and overtime provisions to nonsupervisory state and municipal employ-
ees.5' That 1974 amendment was challenged in National League on the basis
that it bypassed "an affirmative limitation on the exercise of its power. . ." .*1 In
a five to four decision, 3 the majority accepted that argument. The majority
3See e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (In refuting the appellant's tenth amendment
argument the Court stated, "The amendment states but a truism.").
"392 U.S. 183 (1968).
'Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, §203(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §203(d) (1978)). In
actuality, the challenged regulations involved the 1961 and 1966 amendments of the FLSA which had
removed exemptions for state activities. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75
Stat. 65 (1961) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §203(s)(2) (1978); Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830 (1966) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§203(s)(4), 203(d), and 203(r)(1) (1978)).
"Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National League of Cities II GA. L. REV. 35,
38-39 (1975). The Court had previously held that wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA had an "effect
on interstate commerce," and therefore, were proper subjects of commerce regulation. United States v. Dar-
by, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
"In Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), the hardline position taken by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124, was slightly relaxed. In Fry, the Supreme Court, in a footnote, stated that
"while the tenth amendment has been characterized as a 'truism' it is not without significance." Fry, 421
U.S. at 547 n. 7. In Fry, the Court did not, however, give any indication what significance the tenth amend-
ment did retain.
-426 U.S. 833 (1976). See also CHASE. supra note 8, at 374.
"Lauter, Court Overrules 'National League of Cities, 7 NAT'L. L.J., March 4, 1985, at 5, col. I (hereinafter
cited as Lauter).
"Tribe, supra note 14, at 1067. In addition, the Court expressly overruled the case of Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183 (1968).
"Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§203(x) (1978)).
"National League, 426 U.S. at 842.
"Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Powell, and Justice
Stewart. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice White, and
Justice Marshall joined, filed his dissent. Justice Stevens issued a separate dissent.
Summer, 19851 RECENT CASES
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held that federal regulations would be upheld only if the regulations did not
"displace the states' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions.'"'
Following the Court's decision, the controversy between dual and
cooperative federalists was renewed .5 Not only had the decision contradicted
numerous cases which rejected challenges based on the tenth amendment, but
it also gave limited guidance as to what was meant by "integral operations"
and "traditional governmental functions."' Therefore, in 1981, the Supreme
Court began the task of clarifying National League. 17 The first case to attempt
such clarification was Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n. 5' In Hodel, the Court developed a three pronged standard for determin-
ing whether the state activity was exempt from regulation. In order to in-
validate a congressional regulation under National League, all three re-
quirements had to be met:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the
'states as states'. Second, the federal regulation must address matters that
are indisputably 'attributes of state sovereignty'. And third, it must be ap-
parent that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly im-
pair their ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
functions. 9
The National League standard enunciated in Hodel was clarified further
in United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co. 6 Specifically,
Long Island attempted to define "traditional state functions" as set out in the
'National League, 426 U.S. at 853.
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun suggested that the Court had meant to institute a balancing test be-
tween state and federal interests. Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This viewpoint is important in that it
was adopted in later decisions. Eventually, however, Blackmun abandoned that view. See infra notes 87-113,
and accompanying text.
Justice Brennan, in dissent, insisted that the majority had departed from the views of federalism that ex-
isted from Marshall's time. Id. at 858 (Brennan, J. dissenting). He also disagreed with the majority's view of
the role of the tenth amendment. Id. at 862-63.
"See supra note 22, and accompanying text. See generally, Tribe, supra note 14.; Michelman, States Rights
and States Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty " in National League of Cities v. Usery 86 YALE L.J. 1165
(1977). (hereinafter cited as Michelman).
'Constitutional Limitations, supra note 17, at 122-23. The small bit of guidance that the Court gave was in a
footnote. In this footnote, Justice Rehnquist stated that fire protection, police protection, sanitation, public
health, and parks and recreation were an unexhausted list of protected state activities. National League, 426
U.S. at 851 n. 16. This lack of guidance is most apparent in lower court decisions which took divergent
paths. Some lower courts accepted the balancing test suggested in Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion.
See e.g., Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914 (D.N.D. 1977); Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial
Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). Other lower courts have utilized Justice Rehnquist's strict un-
qualified standard. See, e.g., Amersach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F. 2d 1033 (6th cir. 1979); Alewine v. City
Council of Augusta, 505 F. Supp. 880 (S.D. Ga.), modified, 699 F.2d 1060 (11 th Cir. 1981).
"Beschle, supra note 9, at 169.
5452 U.S. 264 (1981).
"Id. at 288-89.
0455 U.S. 678 (1982).
(Vol. 19: I
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third prong of the Hodel test." The decision did not provide a concise defini-
tion, but, it did establish that history and tradition were not the sole deter-
minates in defining traditional state functions.62
Following Long Island, the Supreme Court again seemingly narrowed the
position of National League in FERC v. Mississippi. 63 In FERC, the Court ac-
cepted the argument that the states were merely required to consider, not
adopt, federal policies. The challenged regulation, therefore, failed to fulfill the
three requirements expressed in Hodel." This case was indicative of the form-
ing trend which disregarded those views expressed in National League, and
began to support the cooperative federalist viewpoint.65
The next step in this trend was evident in EEOC v. Wyoming. " Using the
balancing test set out in Justice Blackmun's National League concurrence,67
the Court upheld a federal regulation due to its minimum significance and im-
pact on state sovereignty." While this ruling followed the pattern set out by its
predecessors, it caused many to question the continued validity of National
League and the viewpoints of dual federalism. 6' These questions were
answered by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.70
THE FACTS
Originally, the transportation systems in San Antonio were privately
owned.7 In the early 1900's, Texas authorities and municipalities began to en-
act legislation to regulate the transportation businesses.72 The system of pri-
vately owned, publicly regulated, transportation continued until 1959, when
San Antonio purchased a transit company and created a public authority
known as the San Antonio Transit System (SATS). In 1978, SATS was later
transferred to another public authority known as the San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority (SAMTA). 3 Like many other public transportation
systems, SAMTA and SATS were the recipients of massive federal subsidies. 4
11d. at 684.
21d. at 687.
3456 U.S. 742 (1982).
"Id. at 761.
'Lauter, supra note 49, at 5 col. 2.
-460 U.S. 226 (1983).
'National League, 426 U.S. at 857 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See supra note 54, and accompanying text.
"EEOC 460 U.S. at 238-39.
"Lauter, supra note 49, at 5 col. 2.




"Id. at 1008. From December of 1970 until February of 1980, SAMTA received over $51,000,000 in sub-
sidies from the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964.
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In 1966, when Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
to include public mass transit, SATS fully complied with all minimum wage
and overtime provisions. However, ten years later, following National League,
SATS rescinded the FLSA overtime provisions." SATS informed its employees
that National League had relieved it from all regulation under the FLSA.76
This situation continued until 1979, when the Wage and Hour Ad-
ministration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion stating that SAM-
TA was not within the state functions covered by National League. " Im-
mediately following issuance of this opinion, SAMTA filed suit in federal
district court against the Secretary of Labor, seeking a declaratory judgment
that SAMTA was within the ambit of National League. 78 That suit was joined
by an employee of SAMTA, Joe Garcia, who made a counterclaim for over-
time pay under the FLSA.79 The district court without opinion granted sum-
mary judgment for SAMTA relying on National League. "
Garcia and the Secretary of Labor immediately appealed the district court
decision to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vacated the
district court ruling, and remanded the case to the district court for recon-
sideration in light of the Court's decision in Long Island. 81 The Court in Long
Island had held that state owned railroad systems were not traditional state
functions as defined in National League. 82
On remand, the district court once again ruled for SAMTA 3 Dis-
tinguishing public mass transit from the state owned railroads in Long Island,
the district court stated that the public mass transit was traditionally a state
function. It also held that public mass transit was similar to the cited examples
of National League, and therefore, could not be distinguished."
The Secretary of Labor and Garcia again appealed the district court's
decision to the United States Supreme Court." The question argued before the
Court was "[wihether or not the principles of the tenth amendment as set forth
"1d. at 1009. While rescinding the overtime provisions, the Court notes that SATS kept a wage scale higher
than provided by the FLSA minimum wage regulation. Id. at 1009 n. 3.
"Id. at 1009.
"Opinion WH-499, 6 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 91:1138 (1979).
"Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1009.
7id.
61d
BGarcia, 457 U.S. 1102 (1982) vacated and remanded. Long Island was decided in between the district
court's decision and the Supreme Court's order. It had held that state owned railroad systems were not tradi-
tional state functions. Long Island, 455 U.S. at 686.
"Long Island, 455 U.S. at 686.
"San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445 (1983).
"Id. at 448.
"After the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction and the initial arguments, the Court scheduled
rearguments. Garcia, 104 S.Ct. 64 (1983); Garcia, 104 S.Ct. 30 (1984).
[Vol. 19:1
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in National League of Cities v. Usery, . . . should be reconsidered.""
THE REASONING IN GARCIA
In a five to four decision, the Court's majority in Garcia'7 set forth two
propositions as to why the standard of National League should be recon-
sidered. Those propositions were: (1) that the standards of National League
had proven to be unworkable;" and (2) that the ruling in National League was
not consistent with accepted concepts of federalism.89
First, the majority focused on the third prong of the Hodel test, which
provided "that the states' compliance with the federal law would directly im-
pair their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional func-
tions."' Applying this prong to the facts in Garcia, the Court's majority at-
tacked National League and its progeny as being unworkable.9 In support of
that argument, the majority cited examples of other federal cases which had at-
tempted to apply the National League standards.92 Of these cases, half were
protected activities under National League, and the other half were not. Yet,
the Court stated that it could not find any distinguishing facts which would
justify the differences in outcome of these cases.93
The majority also pointed out the Supreme Court itself had experienced
difficulty in developing a workable standard in Long Island. 94 There, the Court
had grappled with defining "traditional" without relying rigidly on history.
The Court acknowledged that although numerous constitutional standards
were difficult to apply, other standards had evolved through a case by case
'Garcia, 104 S.Ct. at 3582.
'Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court joined by Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice Mar-
shall, and Justice Stevens. Justice Powell dissented joined by the Chief Justice. Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor issued separate dissents. It is of some interest to note that four members of the Court's majority in
Garcia had dissented in National League. Justice Blackmun, who authored the majority opinion in Garcia,
had concurred in National League. This is significant in that the changing views of Justice Blackmun have
so dramatically altered the concept of federalism and state rights.
"Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1010.
"Id. at 1016.
"Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
"Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1016. See also Tumbling Down, supra note 22, at 646.
"Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1011. Some of these cases include Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of Kansas City, 538
F. Supp. 956, 967-69 (W.D.Mo. 1982), affdon other grounds, 705 F. 2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. pending,
No. 83-183; United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-1103 (9th Cir. 1978); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of
Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1196 (6th Cir. 1981); Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburgh, Kansas, Inc.,
489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-97 (Kan. 1980); Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F.2d 694, 700-701 (Ist Cir.
1977); Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1470-72 (9th Cir. 1983); Friends
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
But see Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1023 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell points out that many of the cases
listed were not applying the National League standards, and that other cases were wrongly decided.
"Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1011. For example, the majority was troubled that under the National League stan-
dards there was a constitutional distinction between licensing drivers, as in United States v. Best, 573 F.2d
1095, 1102-1103 (9th Cir. 1978) (a traditional state function), and regulating traffic, as in Friends of the
Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977) (non-traditional state function).
"Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1012.; See also supra note 61, and accompanying text.
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development." The majority felt that the standards of National League had
not evolved,9 and analogized this to the similar problems experienced in the
state tax immunity cases.9
Finally, the Court supplemented its reasoning by explaining why the
historic and nonhistoric definitions of "traditional state functions" were as
equally unworkable as National League. " The Court felt the problems defin-
ing "traditional" were the product of a standard which was not faithful to our
constitutional principles."
Next, the majority attacked the constitutional basis of National League.
The Court stated that there are few, if any, express elements of state sovereign-
ty in the Constitution. The Court pointed out that there are, however, many
examples of powers expressly withdrawn from the state." Although the Court
acknowledged that the states do retain rights, the retention itself was not seen
as illustrating the extent of the retained state rights.'
The majority felt that the principal way for states to ensure their separate
existence was the structure of government itself.02 Most importantly, the
political influence of the states was cited as a means of self-preservation. 03 The
Court noted that states are given a role in choosing the President through the
electoral college;' ° they are in control of electoral qualifications; 05 and each
state is given equal representation in the Senate.'0 These roles, in addition to
the past achievements of states within the federal system,0'1 have helped to en-
sure their separate existence.
"Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1012.
9ld.; See also Tumbling Down, supra note 22, at 646.
"Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1013-14. There, the Supreme Court abandoned an attempt to distinguish between
governmental and proprietary functions because it was an unworkable standard. New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572,73 (1946).
"Garcia. 105 S.Ct. at 1014-15.
"Id. at 1015.
'"Id. at 1017. Examples of such withdrawn powers exist in U.S. CONST. art. I §8, the fourteenth amendment




'id.; See also Constitutional Limitations, supra note 17, at 119.; Wechsler, supra note 1, at 546.; But see
Tribe, supra note 14, at 1071.
I'The five hundred thirty eight (538) member electoral college is composed of one elector for each of a state's
Senators, and an additional elector for each state's mandatory member of the House of Representatives. The
remaining three hundred eighty eight (388) electors are apportioned among the states according to their
population. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
'*'The electors in the electoral college are chosen by each state legislature. The states may appoint anyone so
long as they are not a U.S. Congressman or a U.S. official. U.S. CoNsr. art. 11, § 1.
"'U.S. CONST. art. 1, §3.
"'Garcia, 105 S.Ct. 1019 (reference to the federal grant programs).
The Court also acknowledged the changes in circumstances since the formation of the Union; however, it
felt that this fact did not justify the result in National League. Id. at 10 19-20.
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Next, the Court determined that there was nothing in the FLSA which
could possibly destroy states' autonomy.'" Citing the massive grants given by
the federal government, the Court stated that there were very limited re-
quirements made upon states in exchange for federal grants."' The Court did
concede that there could be some affirmative limits on federal commerce
clause action affecting the states."0 It did not, however, feel the need to list any
such limitations."'
Finally, the Court went on to its inevitable overruling of National
League. 112 While assuring that it did not readily overrule recent precedent, the
Court felt that the federal system of government required it to do so in this in-
stance.'
Justice Powell, in his dissent, completely disagreed with the majority opin-
ion."' First, he felt the majority had not given sufficient deference to the doc-
trine of stare decisis.'" As an example, he pointed to FERC v. Mississippi, "6
where the majority had been the same five Justices that composed the majority
in Garcia. Yet, in FERC, the majority had utilized the principles in National
League, and had given no hint that the concept underlying National League
were unsound."7
More importantly, however, Justice Powell felt that the Court's decision
had reduced the tenth amendment to "meaningless rhetoric when Congress
acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause.""' In fact, Justice Powell pointed out
that the majority made only one small reference to the tenth amendment in its
opinion."19
Next, Justice Powell stated that the majority had misinterpreted National
League. 10 He pointed out that Justice Rehnquist's opinion in National League
did not require a balancing test, and further reasoned that there was no need to







"'Justice Powell was joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor. See supra note
87, and accompanying text.
"'Garcia. 105 S.Ct. at 1021.
"6456 U.S. 742 (1982).
"'Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1022 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1131d.
"'Id. at 1023, 1030.
'"ld. at 1022.
"'Id at 1024. In fact, it was Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Garcia which had advocated a balancing
test. See supra note 54 for further discussion. Justice Powell also pointed out that the FLSA was involved in
both Garcia and National League. Yet, Justice Blackmun does not cite any reasons why he has had a change
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disagreed with the majority on the effectiveness of the political process in pro-
tecting states interests.' He was especially troubled by the inference that Con-
gress could be the sole check on itself in the commerce clause area."'
Finally, Powell expressed his interpretation of federalism. After citing the
history of the Constitutional Convention, and several federalist writers, 2'
Justice Powell stated that the Garcia decision undermined the balance of
power mandated by the Constitution.2 ' It was his view that democracy was
best served at the state and local levels.1 26
Likewise in dissent, Justice O'Connor voiced many of the same concerns
and viewpoints as Justice Powell. Justice O'Connor felt that there was a need
for affirmative limits on the commerce clause power, especially in light of the
recent growth of federal regulation.'27 As a result of the overruling of National
League, however, she suggested that the only limit on Congress was its own,
seldom used, self-restraint.
20
Not surprisingly, the author of National League, Justice Rehnquist, also
filed a dissent. In his brief opinion, Justice Rehnquist agreed in principle with
Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor, he did not, however, accept the balanc-
ing tests seemingly suggested by them.'29 He also stated he believed that the
position espoused by the Garcia dissenters was "a principle that will,... in
time again command the support of a majority of this Court.'1 30
FEDERALISM AFTER GARCIA
The future of dual federalism remains uncertain with the overruling of
National League. Strict adherence to the majority opinion in Garcia seems to
suggest that the states should sit back and let the political processes run their
course. However, several other theories have been suggested to determine the
future of federalism.
One author suggests that the concept of federalism be abolished
altogether.' 3' At the other extreme, another author suggests that Congress
of mind about the effect of the statute.
"'Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1026.
'11d. at 1027.
"'ld. at 1028.
'12 1d. at 1029.
'
2 ld. at 1031-32. Justice Powell's view on federalism significantly parallels those of the dual federalists.
"'Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1037 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Unlike Justice Rehnquist's strict National League
standard, Justice O'Connor supports a balancing test with state sovereignty as a factor against commerce
clause power.
128d.
"Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30Id.
"Kinsey, The WitheringAway of the States, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 28, 1981, at 21. The author seems
to believe that giving back powers to the states, would merely substitute one inefficient government for
another. He feels that the federal government is the lesser of the two evils.
[Vol. 19: I
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should merely attempt to show deference in regulating the states.' More
realistically, though, states should continue to be given freedom from federal
intervention when they are attempting to preserve individual rights.'
The most viable theory suggested at this time stems in part from the ma-
jority opinion in Garcia. In Garcia, the majority states that any affirmative
limitation on the commerce power should be "tailored to compensate for possi-
ble failings in the national political process ... ."I"3 The theory of federalism
evolving from this proposition is that states must be given deference in areas
where Congress is not politically accountable.' These are areas where state
and local officials are held politically responsibile for actions mandated by
federal regulation.'36 It is an obvious failing of the political system when one
level of government is held accountable for the actions of another. This failure
may be the future basis for affirmative limits on the commerce clause.
Beyond the theoretical future of federalism, however, is the immediate ef-
fect of Garcia. One implication of Garcia is that now neither the states, nor the
judiciary may undermine the federal government when implementing impor-
tant national policies.' The sole limit to Congress in the commerce area will
be the standards as set out in Wickard v. Filburn. 3 This limitation will pre-
vent the judiciary from taking it upon itself to second guess legislative deci-
sions made in the commerce clause area.13 9
There are also some disturbing implications of the Court's opinion. Since
National League has been overruled, the Fair Labor Standards Act will now
reach all state and local governmental employees." ° Although the dictates of
the FLSA may be considered fair to employees, the imposition of the FLSA
will cause difficulties in local governmental operations."' These difficulties will
be most apparent in local volunteer programs for such areas as police, and fire
services."2
"'Babbitt, States Rights for Liberals, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 24, 1981, at 23. (hereinafter cited as Babbitt).
"'Beschle, supra note 9, at 117; see generally Tribe, supra note 14. At first, this theory was proposed as a
justification for the rationale behind National League. However, with the overruling of National League, it
may now be the basis of a viable theory for applying essential individual rights to the states. This is especially
true in light of the continued expansion of "individual rights" exemplified by the first ten amendments.
"'Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 10 19-20.
I'Michelman, supra note 55, at 1173-1176.
3 Id.
"'Tribe, supra note 14, at 1099.; see also Michelman, supra note 55, at 1192.
1'317 U.S. 111 (1942). See supra note 41, and accompanying text.
"'IMichelman, supra note 55, at 1192.
"'Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1007. Most importantly, the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA
will apply to state and local governmental employees.
"'CANTON REPOSITORY, July 28, 1985, at 31, col. 1.
"'Id. The intricacies of the minimum wage and overtime provisions will effectively eliminate many local
volunteer programs due to the fact that the law requires compensation for these volunteers. For example, in
a program where full-time firefighters volunteer extra hours on their days off, the FLSA will require over-
time payment. Another example is when volunteer police are used regularly or used to do the work of
regular full-time policemen. The use of these volunteers will require that they be paid at least minimum
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In overruling National League, the Court has also opened the way for vir-
tually any type of regulation upon the states.43 The Court has also afforded
Congress the opportunity to become needlessly involved in local matters.'"
Also of consequence, the Court has implied that by conditioning federal grant
monies Congress may control concerns of state autonomy.'4'5 The Court
perceives these conditions placed upon the states by the federal government as
minor inconveniences when compared to the grants received.'" But the Court,
in making such an assertion, seriously risks the imposition of unforseeable and
unreasonable conditions on federal funding. 47
Lastly, it is important to analyze the historical effect of Garcia. From
Gibbons v. Ogden"8 to Wickard v. Filburn, 4 9 Congress' commerce power had
grown dramatically, especially in areas traditionally felt to be sovereign to the
states.5 0 At first, when legislation was enacted to reflect this growth, it was
challenged and upheld in cases such as Maryland v. Wirtz. "I Years later in Na-
tional League, 2 however, a differently composed Supreme Court struck down
legislation identical to that in Maryland v. Wirtz. " Now, in Garcia, the
changing viewpoint of one Justice has reversed National League. 14
This line of cases presents a seesaw of indecision on the part of the Court
involving an important constitutional concept. Out of this indecision, there
will arise a level of uncertainty as to the meaning of federalism. This uncertain-
ty will be compounded further by the fact that five of the nine Supreme Court
Justices are rapidly approaching their eighties.' 5 In the near future, there will
be many changes in the Courts' composition. It is possible that any change on
the Court may reflect itself on viewpoints about federalism, even to the extent
wage. These requirements will further tax many local governments which are being forced to operate under
budget cuts already.
"'Lauter, supra note 49, at 5.
'"Babbitt, supra note 132, at 23.
"'Garcia, 105 S.Ct. at 1020.
46Id.
"Id. A program recently proposed by the Reagan Administration is illustrative of the possible conditions
that may be imposed on states. The federal government is attempting to condition federal highway grant
monies upon the states compliance with federally "suggested" drinking ages. This is especially controversial
in that the citizens of several states have recently voted down the federally recommended drinking age of
twenty-one. Yet, the federal governments policy may override the citizens' choice because of the dire need
for federal highway monies. Highway Safety Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-363, 98 Stat. 437
(codified at 23 U.S.C. §158 (1985)).
'"22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I 1(1824).
"'371 U.S. I11 (1942).
"'Restriction, supra note 33, at 467.
11'392 U.S. 183 (1968).
"'National League, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
"l'id. at 855.
"'See supra note 81, and accompanying text.
"'1BLANFORD, supra note 34, at 1128-31. William Brennan, Jr. will be 80 years old in 1986. Chief Justice
Warren Burger, and Lewis Powell, Jr. will be 80 years old in 1987. Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun
will be 80 years old in 1988.
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that Garcia would suffer a similar fate as National League of Cities.
CONCLUSION
The definition of constitutional federalism, as set out in Garcia, has again
given the federal government extensive powers over areas of state sovereignty.
The definition has also effectively surpressed the tenth amendment into in-
significance. While the Court's decision will assist Congress in implementing
important policies, without the limitations of National League, it will also give
Congress the opportunity to become excessively involved in state affairs.
The majority opinion in Garcia did not attempt to create a new standard,
redefine the old standard, or suggest any new ideas on the concept of federal-
ism. The majority merely set out to destroy the flawed application of, perhaps,
an otherwise valid principle of state sovereignty. With this goal accomplished,
the majority has left the states at the mercy of the federal government.
LESLIE ANN IAMS
15
Iams: Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1986
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 19 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol19/iss1/5
